Abstract. We present a fast involutional block cipher optimized for reconfigurable hardware implementations. ICEBERG uses 64-bit text blocks and 128-bit keys. All components are involutional and allow very efficient combinations of encryption/decryption. Hardware implementations of ICEBERG allow to change the key at every clock cycle without any performance loss and its round keys are derived "on-the-fly" in encryption and decryption modes (no storage of round keys is needed). The resulting design offers better hardware efficiency than other recent 128-key-bit block ciphers. Resistance against side-channel cryptanalysis was also considered as a design criteria for ICEBERG.
Introduction
In October 2000, NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) selected Rijndael as the new Advanced Encryption Standard. The selection process included performance evaluation on both software and hardware platforms. However, as implementation versatility was a criteria for the selection of the AES, it appeared that Rijndael is not optimal for reconfigurable hardware implementations. Its highly expensive substitution boxes are a typical bottleneck but the combination of encryption and decryption in hardware is probably as critical.
In general, observing the AES candidates [1, 2] , one may assess that the criteria selected for their evaluation led to highly conservative designs although the context of certain cryptanalysis may be considered as very unlikely (e.g. more than 2 100 chosen plaintexts). More recent designs of the NESSIE 1 project (e.g. Khazad [3] , Misty [4] ) provide an improved efficiency. They also allowed interesting comparisons between Feistel networks (e.g. Misty) and substitutionpermutation networks, with respect to hardware efficiency. Although Khazad is not a Feistel network, its structure is designed so that by choosing all components to be involutions, the inverse operation of the cipher differs from the forward operation in the key scheduling only. ICEBERG is also based on an involutional structure but allows to derive the keys more efficiently than Khazad. Moreover, the combination of encryption and decryption is improved due to a simplified diffusion layer.
Reconfigurable hardware devices usually enable high performance encryption/ decryption solutions for real-time applications of multi-Gbps data streams. Videoprocessing is the typical context where high throughput has to be provided at low hardware cost. Although present encryption algorithms may provide very high encryption rates, it is often at the cost of expensive designs. The main feature of ICEBERG is that is has been defined in order to allow very efficient reconfigurable hardware implementations. An additional criteria was the simplicity of the design. ICEBERG is scalable for different architectures (loop, unrolled, pipeline) and FPGA 2 technologies. As a consequence, ASIC 3 implementations are also efficient. All its components easily fit into 4-input lookup tables and its key scheduling allows to derive the round keys "on-the-fly" in encryption and decryption modes. This involves no storage requirements for the round keys. The resulting design offers better hardware efficiency than other recent 128-key-bit block ciphers. As a consequence, very low-cost hardware crypto-processors and high throughput data encryption are potential applications of ICEBERG.
Finally, resistance against side-channel cryptanalysis was also considered as a design criteria for ICEBERG. Small substitution tables are used in order to allow efficient boolean masking. Moreover, the key agility offers the opportunity to consider new encryption modes where the key is changed frequently in order to make the averaging of side-channel traces unpractical. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the design goals of ICEBERG and section 3 gives its specifications. The security analysis of ICEBERG is in section 4 and its performance analysis in section 5. Finally, conclusions are in section 6. Some tables and proofs are given in appendixes.
Design goals
Present reconfigurable components like FPGAs are usually made of reconfigurable logic blocks combined with fast access memories (RAM blocks) and high speed arithmetic circuits [5, 6] . Basic logic blocks of FPGAs include a 4-input function generator (called lookup table, LUT), carry logic and a storage element.
As reconfigurable components are divided into logic elements and storage elements, an efficient implementation will be the result of a better compromise between combinatorial logic used, sequential logic used and resulting performances. These observations lead to different definitions of implementation efficiency [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 1. In terms of performances, let the efficiency of a block cipher be the ratio T hroughput (M bits/s)/Area (LU T s, RAM blocks). 2. In terms of resources, the efficiency is easily tested by computing the ratio N br of LU T s/N br of registers: it should be close to one.
The general design goal of ICEBERG is to provide an efficient algorithm for reconfigurable hardware implementations meeting the usual security requirements of block ciphers. More precisely, our design goals were:
1. Good security properties: ICEBERG has a resistance against known attacks comparable to recently published block ciphers (AES, NESSIE). 2. Hardware implementation efficiency (as previously defined). 3. Hardware implementation versatility: ICEBERG is scalable for different architectures (loop, unrolled, pipeline) and FPGA technologies. 4. Resistance against side-channel cryptanalysis.
Specifications

Block and Key Size
Let n be the block bit-size and k be the key bit-size. The state X is represented as a n-bit vector where X(i) (0 ≤ i < n) represents the ith bit from the right. Alternatively, X can be represented as an array of n 4 4-bit blocks, where X j is the jth block from the right. ICEBERG operates on 64-bit blocks and uses a 128-bit key. It is an involutional iterative block cipher based on the repetition of R identical key-dependent round functions.
The Non-Linear Layer γ
Function γ consists of the successive application of non-linear substitution boxes and bit permutations (i.e. wire crossings).
Substitution layers S 0 , S 1 : The substitution layers S j consists of the parallel application of substitution boxes s j to the blocks of the state.
Tables of S-boxes s 0 , s 1 are given in appendix B.
Bit permutation layer P 8: The permutation layer P 8 consists of the parallel application of 8 permutations p8 to the state, where p8 consists of bit permutations on 8-bit blocks of data. Table of p8 is given in appendix B.
Based on previous descriptions, the non-linear layer γ can be expressed as:
For cryptanalytic and software implementation purposes, γ may also be viewed as a unique layer consisting of the application of 8 identical 8 × 8 S-boxes for which the table is given in appendix B.
The Key Addition Layer σ K
The affine key addition σ K consists of the bitwise exclusive or (XOR, ⊕) of a key vector K.
3.4 The Linear Layer K Function K consists of the successive application of binary matrix multiplications and wire crossing layers, combined with the key addition layer for efficiency purposes. We describe it as:
where M , P 64, and P 4 are defined as follows:
Matrix multiplication layer M : The matrix multiplication layer M is based on the parallel application of a simple involutional matrix multiplication.
be a binary involutional (i.e. such that V 2 = I n ) matrix:
M is then defined as:
We define diffusion boxes D as performing multiplication by V . Table of D is given in appendix B.
Bit permutation layer P 64: Permutation P 64 performs bit permutations on 64-bit blocks of data.
Table of permutation P 64 is given in appendix B.
Bit permutation layer P 4: The permutation layer P 4 consists of the parallel application of 16 permutations p4 to the state. p4 consists of bit permutations on 4-bit blocks of data. Table of p4 is given in appendix B.
The purpose of permutation P 4 is to efficiently distinguish encryption from decryption. It will become clearer in section 3.8 and appendix A.
The Round Function ρ K
Finally, the whole round function can be expressed as:
It is illustrated in Figure 1 .
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The Key Schedule
The key scheduling process consists of key expansion and key selection.
The key expansion: This process expands the cipher key
2 . We set the initial key K 0 = K. Then we expand K 0 by a simple key round function β C so that:
Where 0 ≤ i ≤ R and C ∈ Z 2 is a round constant discussed in section 3.9.
The key round β C is pictured in Figure 2 . It consists of the application of non-linear substitution boxes, shift operations and bit permutations:
where τ C , S , and P 128 are defined as follows:
-Shift layer τ C : The shift layer τ C consists of the application of a variable shift operator to the bytes of the key : shift left if C = 1, shift right if C = 0.
-Substitution layer S : The substitution layer S consists of the parallel application of substitution boxes s 0 to the blocks of the key.
Table of S-box s 0 is given in appendix B.
-Bit permutations layer P 128: P 128 performs bit permutation on 128-bit blocks of data. The key selection: From every 128-bit vector K i , we first apply a simple compression function E that selects 64 bits corresponding to key bytes of K i having odd indices. We denote the resulting key as K64 i . Then we apply a key selection layer (φ) that consists of the parallel application of a selection function X to the blocks of the key.
The selection function X takes 4-bit inputs and a selection bit sel:
This selection process is represented in Figure 3 . As a result, we obtain a 64-bit round key denoted by RK Fig. 3 . The key selection function X sel .
Encryption Process
ICEBERG is defined for the cipher key K, as the transformation
The standard number of rounds is R = 16.
Decryption Process
We now show that ICEBERG is an involutional cipher in the sense that the only difference between encryption and decryption is in the key schedule. We will need the following theorem, proven in appendix A:
Then, the decryption process can be obtained as follows. We start from the encryption process:
Then we have for decryption:
Finally the above theorem leads to:
Round Constants
ICEBERG is an involutional cipher in the sense that the only difference between encryption and decryption is in the key schedule. Moreover, if properly chosen, the round constants allow to compute keys "on-the-fly" in encryption and decryption modes. Basically, we would like round keys to satisfy:
This involves that R is even. Then, if the first half of round constants (i.e. until round 8) is 0 (shift left) and the second half is 1 (shift right), the resulting round keys will satisfy Equation (19) .
As a consequence, the only difference between encryption and decryption is the selection function φ of the key bits, as
4 Security Analysis
Design Properties of the Components S-Boxes:
The non-linear layer γ may be viewed as made out of the parallel application of 8 copies of the same 8 × 8 S-box. We designed this S-box such that it has the following properties:
-It is an involution.
-Its nonlinear order ν is maximum, namely 7.
For efficiency purposes, the s-box was generated from a fixed permutation p8 and small 4 × 4 s-boxes s 0 and s 1 that perfectly fits into 4-input LUTs. The generation of the s-boxes is detailed in Appendix C.
The bit permutations: P 64 and P 128 were designed such as to disturb as much as possible the bit alignment inside bytes, in order to provide resistance against some attacks. A remarkable property of P 64 and P 128 is that 2 bits from the same byte are always mapped to 2 bits belonging to different bytes. p8 is involutional and allows to generate good substitution boxes. Finally, p4 allows the selection function X sel to be implemented in one LUT.
The Diffusion Layer: Due to the fact that we attached much importance to hardware implementation aspects in the design of the diffusion layer, it is not optimal. More precisely, it is easy to see that its byte branch number is 4, as the bit branch number of p4 • σ K • D is 4, and because of the remarkable property of P 64 we have just mentioned. The diffusion boxes D were designed so that their combination with the key addition layer σ K can be done inside one LUT.
The key round: The key round has been chosen for its efficiency properties, as well as in order to provide resistance against key schedule cryptanalysis and slide attacks:
1. Non periodicity is provided by the shift operation τ C . 2. Non linearity is provided by non-linear S-boxes. 3. Good diffusion properties are provided by the combination of shifts, S-boxes and bit permutations.
Moreover, the shift layer τ C is used in order to allow the property (19) to be respected. The selection function X sel is necessary to prove the property of Appendix A and is designed such that it fits into a single LUT.
Strength Against Known Attacks
Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis: From the properties of the S-box and the diffusion layer, we can compute that a differential characteristic [13] over 2 rounds of ICEBERG has probability at most (2 −5 ) 4 = 2 −20 . Also, a linear characteristic [14] over these 2 rounds has input-output correlation at most (2 −2 ) 4 = 2 −8 . Therefore loose bounds can be computed for the full cipher (16 rounds):
-The probability of the best differential characteristic is smaller than 2 −160 . -The input-output correlation of the best linear characteristic is smaller than 2 −64 .
The security margin is very likely big enough to prevent variants of differential and linear attacks, such as boomerang [15] and rectangle [16] attacks, multiple linear cryptanalysis [17] , non-linear approximations of outer rounds [18] ,... Note also that the security margin of ICEBERG against linear and differential cryptanalysis is comparable to the one of Khazad. This is probably more than it is necessary, as resistance against structural attacks [19, 20] was probably more determinant in the choice of the number of rounds of Khazad (8), than security margins against linear and differential cryptanalysis.
Truncated and Impossible Differentials: Truncated differentials were introduced in [21] , and impossible differentials in [22, 23] . They typically apply to ciphers operating on well-aligned data blocks (often bytes), such as Khazad or the AES (and many others). However our cipher does not enter in this category because of the P 64 layer, which makes it very difficult to attack this way. Therefore such an attack on the full 16-round cipher seems very unlikely.
Square Attacks: Like truncated differential attacks, square attacks [19] generally apply to ciphers operating on well-aligned data blocks. Therefore the P 64 layer should prevent them efficiently, at least on more than a few rounds. More precisely, consider a batch of 256 m (m ∈ {1...7}) plaintexts, such that 8 − m bytes remain constant for all of them (these bytes are said passive), while the concatenation of the m other bytes takes every possible value (it is said active). This property is preserved by the γ layer. On the contrary, the P 64 layer makes all bytes garbled (i.e. not active nor passive), which prevents pushing a basic "square characteristic" further. The same type of argument could be applied to truncated differential attacks.
Interpolation Attacks: Interpolation attacks [24] are made possible when the S-box has a simple algebraic structure, allowing to express the cipher as a sufficiently simple polynomial or rational expression. The diffusion layer also has a role with this respect. As the S-box of ICEBERG has no simple algebraic expression, it prevents interpolation attacks for more than a few rounds of our cipher.
Higher Order Differential Cryptanalysis: It was introduced by Knudsen in [21] , and relies on finding high order differentials being a constant for the whole cipher. But as the nonlinear order of the S-box we use is maximal, namely 7, we can expect that the maximal value of 63 for the non-linear order of the cipher is reached after a few rounds of ICEBERG.
Slide Attacks: Slide attacks [25, 26] work against ciphers using a periodic key schedule. Although the sequence of subkeys produced by the key schedule of ICEBERG is not periodic, it has a particular structure, namely:
The key schedule of the GOST cipher has some similarities with the one of ICEBERG. Vulnerability of some variants and reduced-round versions of GOST against slide attacks is examined in [26] . However none of the attacks presented there seems to be applicable to our cipher.
Related-Key Attacks:
The first related-key attack has been described in [27] , and is the related-key counterpart of the slide attack. Let us examine a slightly simplified version of ICEBERG, where the initial key addition σ RK • γ is also replaced by a normal round ρ RK R 0 . Then if 2 keys K and K * are such that K 1 =K * 0 , and 2 plaintexts P and P * are such that P * = ρ RK 0 1 (P ), encryption of P under K and of P * under K * will process the same way (with a difference of 1 round) during 8 rounds. However then round keys, and hence computation, will differ; therefore such a related key attack does not work against our key schedule. Forgetting the simplification we made on the first and last round of ICEBERG, a relatedkey attack becomes even more difficult. Differential related-key attacks [28] are also very unlikely to be applicable to ICEBERG, due to the good diffusion and nonlinearity of its key schedule.
Weak keys: The design properties of the key round prevent ICEBERG from having weak keys. The only remarkable property of the key round is in the selection function X sel where some symbols are independent of the selection bit. Namely, hexadecimal input symbols 0, 2, 8, A become 0, C, 3, F regardless of sel = 0 or sel = 1. However, this point is very unlikely to be an exploitable weakness.
Biryukov's observations on Involutional Ciphers: Observations of Biryukov on Khazad and Anubis [29] remain valid for ICEBERG. However this study could at best threaten 5 rounds of our cipher, while it is made out of 16 rounds.
Side-channel cryptanalysis: Although cryptosystem designers frequently assume that secret parameters will be manipulated in closed reliable computing environments, Kocher et al. stressed in 1998 [30] that actual computers and microchips leak information correlated to the data handled. Side-channel attacks based on time, power and electromagnetic measurements were successfully applied to smart card implementations of block ciphers. Protecting implementations against side-channel attacks is usually difficult and expensive. Masking all the data with random boolean values is suggested in several papers [31, 32] and the use of small substitution tables allows to implement this efficiently, although it is still an expensive solution.
The key agility provided by ICEBERG (changing the key at every plaintext block is for free) also offers interesting opportunities to prevent most side-channel attacks by defining new encryption modes where the key is changed sufficiently often. As most side-channel attacks need to collect several leakage traces to remove the noise from useful information, changing the key frequently, even in a well chosen deterministic way (e.g. LFSR-based), would make most attacks somewhat unpractical. Actually, only template attacks [33] allow to extract information from a single sample but the context is also more specific as they require that an adversary has access to an experimental device (identical to the device attacked) that he can program to his choosing.
Performance analysis
ICEBERG has been designed in order to allow very efficient reconfigurable hardware implementations, as defined in section 2. For this purpose, we applied the following design rules:
1. All components easily fit into 4-input LUTs. Practically, ICEBERG is made of the parallel application of 4-input-bit transforms combined with bit permutations or shifts. 2. All components are involutional so that encryption and decryption can be made with the same hardware. The only difference between encryption and decryption is in the selection bit of φ sel . 3. The key expansion allows to derive round keys "on-the-fly" in encryption and decryption modes. There is no need to store the round keys and the key can be changed in one clock cycle.
4. The scheduling of the algorithm is balanced so that the round and key round can be made in the same number of clock cycles. 5. The non-linear layer can be efficiently implemented into the RAM blocks available in most modern FPGAs.
Hardware implementations
As all components easily fit into 4-input LUTs, we can directly evaluate the hardware cost of ICEBERG: As a comparison, Khazad needs 576 LUTs for its round and 768 LUTs for its key round [11] , with a more expensive encryption/decryption structure. AES Rijndael is even more critical as its round needs 2608 LUTs and its key round 768 LUTs [12] . Although comparisons between hardware implementations are made difficult by their high dependency on the design methodology, we may reasonably expect to have ICEBERG encryption/decryption for the cost of Khazad encryption only and half the cost of Rijndael encryption, with comparable encryption rates.
Moreover, the parallel nature of ICEBERG allows to implement every possible throughput/area tradeoff as well as very efficient pipeline. The maximum pipeline can be obtained by inserting registers after every LUT which allows to reach an optimal ratio N br of LU T s/N br of registers = 1. Loop and unrolled architectures are easily implementable with LUT-based or RAM-based substitution boxes. As a consequence, ICEBERG offers various and efficient implementation opportunities. Its regular structure makes the classical design optimizations easily reachable. Software efficiency is not a design goal of ICEBERG. It is briefly discussed in Appendix D.
Conclusion
This paper presented the platform-specific encryption algorithm ICEBERG and the rationale behind its design. ICEBERG is based on a fast involutional structure in order to provide very efficient hardware implementation opportunities. We showed the specificity of this type of platform in block cipher design. We also underlined that the overall structure of a cipher is important for efficiency purposes (for example, in designing rounds and key rounds that can be made in the same number of clock cycles, or in allowing "on the fly" key derivation in both encryption and decryption modes). We believe ICEBERG to be as secure as AES and NESSIE candidates and much more efficient for reconfigurable hardware implementations. ICEBERG also offers free opportunities to defeat most side-channel attacks by using adequate encryption modes.
B Tables. C Generation of the ICEBERG S-box [3] As P 8 is fixed, the only part of the ICEBERG S-box structure still unspecified consists of the s 0 and s 1 involutions, which are generated pseudo-randomly in a verifiable way.
The searching algorithm starts with two copies of a simple involution without fixed points (namely, the negation mapping u →ū = u ⊕ 0xF), and pseudorandomly derives from each of them a sequence of 4 × 4 substitution boxes ("mini-boxes") with the optimal values δ = 1/4, λ = 1/2, and ν = 3. At each step, in alternation, only one of the sequences is extended with a new mini-box. The most recently generated mini-box from each sequence is taken, and the pair is combined according to the ICEBERG S-box shuffle structure; finally, the resulting 8 × 8 S-box, if free of fixed points, is tested for the design criteria regarding δ, λ, and ν.
Given a mini-box at any point during the search, a new one is derived from it by choosing two pairs of mutually inverse values and swapping them, keeping the result an involution without fixed points; this is repeated until the running mini-box has optimal values of δ, λ, and ν.
The pseudo-random number generator is implemented using the AES cipher Rijndael in counter mode, with a fixed key consisting of 128 zero bits and an initial counter value consisting of 128 zero bits.
